Neoconservatism as Discourse:Virtue, Power and US Foreign Policy

Neoconservatism in US foreign policy is a hotly contested subject, yet most scholars broadly agree on what it is and where it comes from. From a consensus that it first emerged around the 1960s, these scholars view neoconservatism through what we call the ‘3Ps’ approach, defining it as a particular group of people (‘neocons’), an array of foreign policy preferences and/or an ideological commitment to a set of principles. While descriptively intuitive, this approach reifies neoconservatism in terms of its specific and often static ‘symptoms’ rather than its dynamic constitutions. These reifications may reveal what is emblematic of neoconservatism in its particular historical and political context, but they fail to offer deeper insights into what is constitutive of neoconservatism. Addressing this neglected question, this article dislodges neoconservatism from itsperceived home in the ‘3Ps’ and ontologically redefines it as a discourse. Adopting aFoucauldian approach of archaeological and genealogical discourse analysis, we trace itsdiscursive formations primarily to two powerful and historically enduring discourses ofthe American self — virtue and power — and illustrate how these discourses produce aparticular type of discursive fusion that is ‘neoconservatism’. We argue that to betterappreciate its continued effect on contemporary and future US foreign policy, we needto pay close attention to those seemingly innocuous yet deeply embedded discoursesabout the US and its place in the world, as well as to the people, policies and principlesconventionally associated with neoconservatism

Myths of neoconservatism: George W. Bush's "neo-conservative" foreign policy revisited

The objective of this article is to refute the popular and influential view that neoconservatism is the driving force behind US foreign policy under George W. Bush. In fact, neoconservatism — properly understood — has been a marginal influence on a foreign policy, which has been characterized primarily by a different kind of conservative ideology. In order to demonstrate this, the article firstly seeks clearly to define contemporary neoconservatism in the foreign policy context; it then goes on to examine the Bush foreign policy and its key elements. What all this reveals is that US policy has been more driven by nationalist impulses than neoconservative ones. Indeed, those like Stefan Halper and Jonathan Clarke who argue that neoconservatism has been the key component shaping the Bush outlook, not only exaggerate the influence of one particular ideology but underestimate the importance of other key factors determining American policy since 2001